🎯 Thesis Statement

Denying the existence of necessary truths — such as \(2 + 2 = 4\) — undermines any claim to objective knowledge or meaningful discourse. Through a close analysis of Aron Ra’s comments during a public debate, this essay exposes the internal incoherence of relativistic rhetoric and affirms the centrality of the law of non‑contradiction and necessary truths to any consistent worldview.

I. Introduction

In a widely viewed debate on the existence of God, Aron Ra, the famous atheist activist, asserts provocatively:

“Two plus two can equal five depending on higher values of five.”
Later, he doubles down: “I cannot point to even one thing being necessarily true.” (Source: Is There a God? | Aron Ra Vs Jake Brancatella MuslimMetaphysician, Modern-Day Debate on YouTube, 1:29:35) Such claims strike at the heart of reason itself. If nothing is necessarily true, how can one meaningfully call anything absurd? Jake Brancatella’s retort — questioning how the Jonah story could be called “absurd” without appealing to any necessary standard — reveals the self‑refuting nature of denying necessity. This essay will show that repudiating necessary truth leads inevitably to incoherence.

II. Defining Necessary Truth and the Law of Non‑Contradiction

A necessary truth is a proposition true in all conceivable circumstances. For instance,
$$ 2 + 2 = 4 $$
holds in every possible world; symbolically, we write \(\Box(2+2=4)\). The Law of Non‑Contradiction (LNC) states that no proposition \(P\) can be both true and false in the same respect at the same time: $$ \neg (P \land \neg P). $$
These principles are not mere conventions; they undergird coherent discourse, scientific reasoning, and any claim to knowledge.

III. Aron Ra’s Statements: A Breakdown

Aron Ra’s two central assertions are:

  1. “Two plus two can equal five depending on higher values of five.”
  2. “I cannot point to even one thing being necessarily true.”

By invoking an ambiguous “higher mathematics,” Ra conflates abstract redefinition with truth relativism. One can define a new operation “\(\oplus\)” such that \(2 \oplus 2 = 5\), but this does not negate that, under standard arithmetic, \(2 + 2 = 4\). Ra’s tactic invites confusion: it erodes the distinction between inventing new symbols and denying the underlying necessity of existing truths.

IV. The Jonah Moment: The Self‑Refuting Nature of Ra’s Position

During the debate, Ra dismisses the biblical Jonah narrative as “absurd.” Brancatella immediately asks: “On what basis are you calling it absurd, if you deny all necessary truths?” Labeling something absurd presupposes standards — logical or empirical — by which absurdity is judged. Yet if no proposition is necessarily true, no such standard can coherently exist. Thus, Ra’s denunciation of absurdity collapses into incoherence: he relies on the very necessities he claims to reject.

V. Philosophical Implications of Rejecting Necessary Truth

Denying necessary truths ushers in:

  • Radical skepticism: If no statement is secure, all beliefs become equally baseless.
  • Epistemic nihilism: Knowledge itself loses meaning when certainty vanishes.
  • Moral relativism: Ethical claims cannot be grounded if no truth is stable.

Historical echoes abound — from Greek sophists who denied objective justice to contemporary postmodernists who view truth as socially constructed. The warning is stark: this trajectory not only undermines logic but also threatens ethics and the possibility of shared meaning.

VI. Why Necessary Truth Must Be Defended

Foundational truths are inescapable. Even the attempt to deny them presupposes their framework. Mathematics and logic form the scaffolding of any argument:

  • Rational argumentation relies on the unassailable structure of inference.
  • Scientific progress depends on reproducible, necessary relationships — laws of nature.
  • Ethical clarity requires some non‑arbitrary standard for right and wrong.

To abandon necessary truths is to relinquish the very tools by which we think, speak, and act coherently.

VII. Conclusion

Aron Ra’s pronouncements on arithmetic and necessity collapse under their own weight. By denying necessary truths, he sows the seeds of incoherence and self‑refutation. Objective truth — embodied in the law of non‑contradiction and necessary propositions — remains essential for any consistent worldview. We must defend these principles, not as unthinking dogma, but as the inescapable groundwork of reason and integrity.